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NONPARTISAN UNICAMERAL-BENEFITS,
DEFECTS RE-EXAMINED
By Wiliam Riley*
I. INTRODUCTION
The task of government is not to express an imaginary popular
world, but to effect adjustments among the various special worlds
and purposes which at any given time are pressing for -realiza-
tion.'
The Nebraska legislative form of government is twice unique.
It is unique because it is a unicameral, and it is unique because it is
the only truly nonpartisan legislature.2 In fact, the Nebraska legis-
lative system is probably the only fresh concept in state govern-
ment to succeed during the twentieth century.
3
Although the one-house legislature is well embedded in the Ne-
braska governmental structure the nonpartisan feature is under
constant attack.4 The present legislative session has been no ex-
ception. LB 9, introduced in the current session, proposed a con-
stitutional amendment to provide that the members of the legisla-
* B.A., 1969, and J.D., 1972, University of Nebraska. Member of the Ne-
braska State Bar Ass'n.
1. 1 V. KEY, Politics, PA ITrs, Am PRSsuRE Gnoups 10 (3d ed. 1952).
2. NEB. CoNsT. art. IH. Until recently nonpartisanship was also a feature
of the Minnesota bicameral legislature. In 1973 the Minnesota Legis-
lature amended the selection process to provide for partisan election
of state legislators. No party membership was indicated on the bal-
lots, yet, each chamber was organized into Liberal and Conservative
caucuses. These operated in a manner similar to political parties in
other legislatures, and often there were connections between these
caucuses and the two major parties. Therefore, the Minnesota Legis-
lature was organized in a manner similar to that of a partisan legis-
lature even though the legislators were elected on a nonpartisan bal-
lot. Hagan, The Bicameral Principle in State Legislatures, 11 J. PuB.
L. 310, 316 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Hagan]. See also G. MTAU,
PoLaTcs 3x Mixr so.A, 82 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as MrrAu].
3. Swindler, State Constitutions for the 20th Century, 50 NEs. L. REv. 577,
589 (1971). Over two-thirds of the states have experimented with
new or revised constitutions, but they have continually shied away
from the nonpartisan unicameral. Id. at 577.
4. J. OLSON, ISTORY OF NEBRASxA 325-27 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as OLSON]. With the primary impetus originating within the
Republican and Democratic parties numerous initiative petitions have
been drafted and circulated throughout the state in an attempt to place
the partisan-nonpartisan question upon the ballot. These attempts
have always failed. The same forces have intermittantly tried the
legislative route to place the constitutional change before the voters.
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ture be elected in a partisan manner. The bill's proponents fell
only one vote short of placing the amendment before the voters.
Since the legislature and the people will undoubtedly be con-
fronted with this issue again, it is the purpose of this article to
draw together the threads of controversy which seem to entwine
the nonpartisan concept so that future debate may be more mean-
ingful.
Although the twin features of the Nebraska Legislature may be
mutually independent 5 they possess an almost inextricable history.
Therefore, the development of the nonpartisan unicameral will be
presented first before describing the current debate over the non-
partisan issue. Finally, a compilation and analysis of sundry argu-
ments for and against the nonpartisan legislature will be consid-
ered in order to determine the justification and worth of the non-
partisan unicameral.
II. BACKGROUND
A. EARLY HISTORY
Minnesota and Nebraska developed their divergent strains of
nonpartisanship 6 as the result of different stimuli in history. Party
1939-L.B. 463, motion to lay over to general file defeated 9 for, 18
against, 16 not voting. 1939 NEB. LwG. J. 1215-16 (53d Leg.
Sess).
1951-L.B. 160, indefinitely postponed in committee. 1951 Nw. LEG.
J. 641 (62d Leg. Sess.). Motion to lay over to general file
defeated 15 for, 25 against, 3 not voting. Id. at 686-87.
1957-L.B. 11, indefinitely postponed in committee. 1957 NEB. LEG. J.
138 (68th Leg. Sess.). Motion to lay over to general file de-
feated 6 for, 31 against, 6 not voting. Id. at 612.
1963-L.B. 112, indefinitely postponed in committee 1963 NEB. LEc. J.
1206 (73d Leg. Sess.). Motion to lay over to general file de-
feated 8 for, 34 against, 1 not voting. Id. at 1285.
1987-L.B. 299, passed out of committee to general file. Indefinitely
postponed 26 for, 14 against, 9 not voting. 1967 NB. LEG. J.
1675 (77th Leg. Sess.).
1972-L.B. 1431, passed out of committee to general file. Indefinitely
postponed 42 for, 0 against, 7 not voting on the last day of the
session. 1972 NEB. LE. J. 1753 (82d Leg., 2d Sess.).
1973-L.B. 9, motion to place on the ballot failed 28 for, 19 against, 2
not voting (the original vote was 29 to 18, however, Sen. Richard
F. Proud of Omaha, the Speaker, switched sides to be in a
parliamentary position to ask for reconsideration). 1973 NB.
Lw. J. 352 (83d Leg., 1st Sess.). Motion to reconsider failed 26
for, 16 against, 7 not voting. Id. at 485.
5. G. Saylor, et. al., The Unicameral Legislature: Its Operation in Ne-
braska 36 (Neb. State Teachers' Ass'n: Teachers' Pamphlet No. 5,
1937, on file in U. of Neb.-Lincoln Love Library) [hereinafter cited
as Saylor].
6. Note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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designation was abandoned in Minnesota during the struggle be-
tween the "drys" and the "wets" in 1913.7 In Nebraska the non-
partisan issue was initially rejected by the electorate in 1924,8 but
when nonpartisanship was linked with the unicameral proposal by
George Norris in 19349 the voters accepted the nonpartisan feature
as an adjunct to the new governmental order.10 Nonpartisanship
was so tightly welded to the unicameral theory by Senator Norris
that both concepts must be discussed in conjunction with each
other.
Nebraska was not a newcomer to the unicameralism-bicameral-
ism controversy in 1934; it had been debated since 1913.11 But
7. MIAu, supra note 2, at 80.
[O]pponents of prohibition working with liquor interests
exploited sentiments within the legislature that were strongly
critical of party machines and boss control. One must re-
member that this was the era of progressivism, when par-
ties were disdained and political independence was extolled,
and when it was hoped that direct political action by the peo-
ple (through such means as the initiative, referendum, re-
call, and direct primary) would lead to more responsible
government.
Id.
8. The direct primary and nonpartisan elections were submitted by
popular initiative and defeated by a vote of 163,932 in favor and
228,485 against. NEBRAsxA BLuE BooK 119 (1970).
9. "Many felt that the proposal for non-partisan election would defeat
the amendment but, at the insistence of Senator Norris, this feature
was retained." Lancaster, Nebraska's New Legislature, 22 Nine. L.
REv. 60, 61-62 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Lancaster]. See also
OLSON, supra note 4, at 323. "The result of the vote however showed
conclusively that all of those apprehensions were groundless." Sen-
ning, The One-House Legislature in Nebraska, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 341, 348
(1934) [hereinafter cited as Senning].
10. The nonpartisan unicameral was submitted by popular initiative and
adopted by a vote of 286,086 in favor and 193,152 against. NEBRASKA
BLE BOOK 119 (1970).
11. Note, Unicameralism and Bicameralism: History and Tradition, 45
BosT. U. L. REV. 250, 265 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Unicameralism].
In 1913 John N. Norton introduced an amendment in the Nebraska
Legislature to provide for a single chamber. A committee report
favored the proposal, but the legislative body rejected the bill. A
majority of the 1915 session favored the concept, however, there were
not enough votes to submit the proposal to the electorate. The 1917
legislature rejected the whole idea. John Norton pressed again at
the 1919-1920 Constitutional Convention for adoption of a one-house
legislature, but his proposal was defeated upon a tie vote with the
president of the convention voting against the innovation. An initi-
ative petition failed in 1923, and amendments before the 1925 and 1933
legislative sessions were likewise doomed to defeat. See Orfield, The
Unicameral Legislature in Nebraska, 34 M1cH. L. Rsv. 26, 27 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Orfield]; Lancaster, supra note 9, at 60; OLSON,
supra note 4, at 322.
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when the nonpartisan unicameral was placed on the 1934 Novem-
ber election ballot with two popular proposals, pari-mutuel bet-
ting and repeal of prohibition, the most unique legislative innova-
tion of the twentieth century was finally accepted. 12
The three prime movers behind the nonpartisan unicameral
were United States Senator George W. Norris, John N. Norton and
Dr. John P. Senning.13 Norton's promotion through the years kept
the unicameral ideal alive in Nebraska, the political astuteness
of George Norris judged the Nebraska voter ready to accept the
proposition in 1934, and Senning's education background provided
the political theory to complete the triumvirate. 4 The leadership
of Senator Norris was probably decisive, since the people of Ne-
braska highly respected his national reputation for governmental
reform.' 5 Within the short span of four weeks Norris addressed
large audiences in major centers of the state and contacted by radio
almost all of the voters of the state.16
Senator Norris converted many voters with his theory that a
legislature should be elected on a businesslike basis and should
function along business lines rather than through political party
channels. 17 Other arguments presented by Norris were that the
legislators and the welfare of the state should not be handicapped
by any partisan matters, competent judges and school officials were
elected on nonpartisan ballots, a nonpartisan legislature would
12. Note 10 supra. The initiative petition establishing a one-house legis-
lature was rejected in only 73 precincts of the 2,029 precincts tallied.
Shumate, The Nebraska Unicameral Legislature, 5 W. POL. Q. 504-05(1952); Unicameralism, supra note 11, at 265; Senning, supra note 9, at
345. And all but 9 of the 93 counties of the state voted in favor
of the amendment. A. BRECKINRIDGE, ONE HOUSE FOR Two: NE-
BRASKA'S UNICAmERAL LEGISLATURE 5 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
BRECKENRMIGE].
13. Srb, The Unicameral Legislature-A Successful Innovation, 40 NEB.
L. REV. 626, n.1 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Srb]. George W. Norris
was the United States Senator from Nebraska. John N. Norton of
Polk, Neb., served in the Nebraska Bicameral Legislature, the United
States Congress and the first unicameral legislature. Dr. John P.
Senning was a professor of political science at the U. of Neb. Id.
14. R. Marvel, Decision-Making in the Nebraska Unicameral Legislature
for the 1959, 1961, and 1963 Sessions 54 (doctoral thesis, 1966, on file
in U. of Neb.-Lincoln Love Library) [hereinafter cited as Marvel].
15. OLSON, supra note 4, at 323; BRECKENBiDGE, supra note 12. The im-
portance of George Norris' support is underscored by the fact that he
was offered Democratic backing for his senatorial campaign if he
would drop the nonpartisan feature. He refused saying that he wanted
the entire package or none at all. Alembrete & Fishburne, The Uni-
cameral Legislature, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 355, 359, n.23 (1964).
16. Senning, supra note 9, at 345.
17. Id. at 348.
NONPARTISAN UNICAMERAL
avoid party machines and bosses,18 and the influence of national
issues would no longer affect strictly state elections. 19 Addi-
tional reasons given during the campaign for adoption of the non-
partisan feature were that it would preserve the legislature as a
separate and distinct branch of government by preventing the gov-
ernor of the majority party from controlling the legislature, 20 a
nonpartisan election would result in better individuals running and
being selected for office, less legislative time would be wasted by
political bickering and rivalry between members, each member
would assume a position of responsibility rather than that of a cog
in a political machine, measures would be advanced or killed on
their merits rather than on the basis of political considerations or
feelings, and political parties in Nebraska have never been the main
vehicle for solving the major state problems. 21
Organized opposition cut deeply across party lines because the
nonpartisan legislature proved unpalatable to the orthodox party
adherents. Former legislators feared that their chances of re-elec-
tion would be jeopardized.22 Governor R. L. Cochran, probably the
18. Norris, One-House Legislatures, 17 PHm. L. J. 356, 360-61 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as Norris].
19. Norris, The One-House Legislature, 24 NAT'L MuN. REv. 87, 89, 99
(1935) [hereinafter cited as One-House]. A radio address delivered
Feb. 5, 1935, in the You and Your Government series.
George Norris of McCook, Neb., spent his career on the fringe of
political parties, and as a result of his independence he did not treat
the political parties with any great respect, and the parties did
not treat him with much favor either. Rep. Norris fought against
Speaker Cannon in 1910, and Sen. Norris joined the recalcitrant Pro-
gressive Republicans in 1912, 1916 and 1924. In the bitter election
of 1924 the fact that Norris campaigned for the Progressives and was
re-elected to the Senate as a Republican illustrates that Nebraska
voters have never slavishly followed party lines. The Republicans
made a desperate effort in 1930 to defeat Norris by having George
W. Norris, a grocery clerk at Broken Bow, file for the Senate. The
filing arrived in Lincoln two days late, however, Secretary of State
Frank Marsh accepted it since it was postmarked in Broken Bow
within sufficient time. Norris' friends, led by Attorney General C.A.
Sorensen, immediately brought action, and an opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Goss that the filing was invalid kept "Grocer Norris" off the bal-
lot. In 1936 Norris accepted the Independent nomination advocated
by The Lincoln Star. With the aid of President Roosevelt's support and
presence, he defeated the Democratic nominee, Terry Carpenter, and
the Republican nominee, Robert G. Simmons. George Norris was
not a partisan, and his political experiences and attitudes fixed his
inflexible nonpartisan stance regarding the Nebraska Unicameral.
OLSON, supra note 4, at 245, 293-95, 304-05.
20. Senning, Constitutional Essentials for a Unicameral Legislature, 11 U.
KA. CiTy L. REv. 10, 13-14 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Essentials].
21. Saylor, supra note 5, at 37.
22. Senning, supra note 9, at 345.
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leading opponent of the nonpartisan feature,23 issued an appeal to
tradition and party loyalty.2 4 Some farm groups and most mi-
nority groups opposed the amendment on the grounds that the
proposed legislature's membership was too restricted and farmers,
blacks and women would not be adequately represented. 25 Most
of the press, led by the Omaha World-Herald, fought the innova-
tion.26  The most frequent criticisms were that nonpartisanship
would result in a lack of leadership in the legislature, there would
be no responsible group action but rather blocs and cliques of leg-
islators organized to secure specific legislation, no plan of action
or legislative program would develop, and there would be lack of
coordination and cooperation with the governor.2 7
Why was the nonpartisan unicameral concept successful in
1934? The significant role played by George Norris was crucial, 28
and the beneficial effect of the co-proposals on the ballot, pari-mu-
tuel betting and repeal of prohibition, attracted some affirmative
responses;29 however, there were other basic factors which made
the time ripe for change.
The economic depression of the 1930's made the people turn to
government for relief, but when the government failed to render
adequate assistance many people became disposed to alter the ex-
isting system.3 0 Furthermore, 1934
was the year of the first election since the New Deal experimen-
tation was in the air. The 1932 election swept in many members
without legislative experience, and the long drawn out session and
contentious spirit of its members led to popular disfavor.3 1
23. Saylor, supra note 5, at 36.
24. Senning, supra note 9, at 345.
25. OLSON, supra note 4, at 323; Aylsworth, Nebraska's Nonpartisan Uni-
cameral Legislature, 26 NAT'L MuN. REV. 77, 78 (1937) [hereinafter
cited as Aylsworth].
26. OLSON, supra note 4, at 323. The only papers supporting the amend-
ment were The Lincoln Star and the Hastings Tribune. Id.
27. Saylor, supra note 5, at 38.
28. See notes 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 supra and accompanying text. "The
fact that the unicameral measure had the backing of Sen. Norris was
reason enough for adoption in the eyes of many voters." Orfield,
supra note 11, at 28.
29. BRECKENR DGE, supra note 12, at 5, 44; OLSON, supra note 4, at 324;
Unicameralism, supra note 11, at 265; Orfield, supra note 11, at 28.
Lancaster claims that "closer analysis does not support this theory" of
the pari-mutuel betting and prohibition repeal amendments giving
any significant aid to the nonpartisan unicameral proposal. Lan-
caster, supra note 9, at 62-63.
30. See generally BRncKFNniDGE, supra note 12, at 8, 44; Marvel, supra note
14, at 39, 52.
31. Orfield, supra note 11, at 28. The 1933 legislature
left a bad taste in the mouths of many voters .... Possi-
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However, the mood of experimentation ushered in by the New Deal
still fueled the fire of change.3 2
Other forces militating for change were the public disenchant-
ment with the conference committee between the two legislative
houses, the desire to force open consideration of legislation, the
feeling that the smaller sized legislature and nonpartisanship
would heighten responsibility, the hope of lessening the impact of
special interests, and the obvious saving in expenditures in a one
house rather than a two house legislature.33
One extremely important element was (and still is) the tradi-
tional independence and nonpartisanship of Nebraska's people and
their legislators.34 The political environment in Nebraska con-
tained an agrarian populace with a business orientation; a large
percentage of elderly voters; many poor, thrifty, conservative, and
pragmatic immigrants; an urban (Omaha and Lincoln)-rural
schism; and an east-west geographic split. Also present were the
historic political factors of an ingrained pioneer spirit and a lack
of commitment to any political philosophy.3 5  As one writer has
observed:
Perhaps it is not too far fetched to trace the individualism and
the nonpartisanship of early agricultural political revolts to the
signs of weakness in the Nebraska political parties by the mid-
1930's, and ultimately to the establishment of a nonpartisan state
legislature.3 6
bly because it contained an unusually large number of inex-
perienced members, it wasted a good deal of time on triviali-
ties. It produced out of its own ranks no vigorous or confi-
dent leaders able to take in hand the more than usually vo-
ciferous rank and file. The serious illness of Governor Bryan
which continued throughout the session deprived it of what
might well have been effective and prudent guidance.
Lancaster, Nebraska Considers a One-House Legislature, 23 NAT'L
MuN. REV. 373, 375 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Nebraska Considers].
32. Lancaster, supra note 9, at 62.
33. Id. at 62-63.
34. See Lancaster, Nebraska's Experience with a One-House Legislature,
11 U. KAN. C= L. REV. 24, 25 (1942). "[E]ven under the bicameral
system party votes were rare in Nebraska, where political independ-
ence long ago hardened into a tradition." Lancaster, supra note 9,
at 73. In the 1930's there were a "large number of independent vot-
ers in the state." Nebraska Considers, supra note 31, at 376.
35. Marvel, The Nonpartisan Nebraska Unicameral, 1967 MMIWEST LEG.
POL. 89, 90-95 [hereinafter cited as Nonpartisan].
36. Marvel, supra note 14, at 40.
The farmers lack of enthusiasm "about farm organizations is
reminiscent of this same general lack of commitment to the
political organization." [CAMPBELL, et al., THE AmERIcAN
VoTm 415 (1960)] Evidence of low agrarian political in-
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Thus, the essential ingredients leading to the adoption of Ne-
braska's Nonpartisan Unicameral were the economic depression
which created an air of experimentation, the political environment
of the state including the traditional nonpartisanship of the people,
and the leadership provided by the popular Senator Norris.
B. THE NEW EXPERIENCE
In 1937 forty-three nonpartisan legislators replaced 100 partisan
representatives and thirty-three partisan senators when the new
Nebraska Nonpartisan Unicameral was convened. Much to the cha-
grin of the opponents of the nonpartisan unicameral, the elections
presented the voters with a wider array of candidates (partially
due to the significant decrease in legislative seats: 133 to forty-
three), and the electorate apparently chose a better caliber of sen-
ator than had been chosen in the past.3 7 The new senators were
generally better equipped in native ability, educational training
and legislative experience than their predecessors. 38 The new leg-
islature also was representative of those farm and minority groups
that had previously opposed the change.39
The political complexion of the legislature was altered mark-
edly. Twenty-one Republicans and twenty-two Democrats were
elected in a strongly Democratic election year and in contrast to the
two preceding bicameral partisan bodies where Democrats had out-
numbered Republicans at least two to one.40
The first nonpartisan unicameral worked within the spirit of
nonpartisanship and avoided party caucuses and party conflicts.
Party affiliation had little to do with the organization of the new
body. The speakership, for example, went to a Republican. The
only charges of partisanship arose over the legislature's contacts
with the state railway commission and the vote to express the sen-
timent of the senate towards President Roosevelt's "court packing"
plan.41
Although Governor Cochran charged that there was "no formal
responsible leadership" in the unicameral and that "all formal lines
volvement ... indicates "a partisan fluidity" and lack of
general ideological concern for political movements.
Id.
37. Aylsworth, supra note 25, at 77-78; Carter, The Unicameral Legisla-
tive System, 21 FLA. L.J. 112 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Carter];
BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 12, at 34; Norris, supra note 18, at 362.
38. Aylsworth, supra note 25, at 80.
39. Id. at 78, 80; Note 25 supra and accompanying text.
40. Aylsworth, supra note 25, at 79.
41. Lancaster, supra note 9, at 66, 72.
NONPARTISAN UNICAMERAL
of communication between the legislative and executive branches
have been removed,142 the governor apparently had no difficulty in
securing a hearing. Furthermore, on the few occasions that he car-
ried his cause to the legislature in unequivocal language he was
able to command a following.43 Polls taken at the conclusion of
the session showed that the large majority of senators supported
the nonpartisan legislature, a considerable reversal from their or-
iginal disfavor.44
Through the years the spirit of nonpartisanship has prevailed
with many instances of leadership and committee posts being given
to members who would have represented the minority party in the
legislature. 45 And, of course, senators have been elected from dis-
tricts which would have denied them that privilege if the party
label had been attached.46
Some valid criticisms have been leveled at the nonpartisan uni-
cameral over the years. Inadequate organization, failure of leader-
ship, poor executive-legislative communications, and the dominant
role of lobbyists and special interest groups have been offered as
reasons for reverting to a partisan legislature. These charges and
others will be compiled and analyzed later.
III. CURRENT DEBATE
The 1969 legislature established the Nebraska Constitutional Re-
vision Commission to recommend changes in the Nebraska Constitu-
tion. 47  It is of some consequence that this commission recom-
mended the retention of the nonpartisan unicameral.48  The reten-
tion of the nonpartisan feature was, however, a close question with
the first vote resulting in a tie49 and the final vote preserving the
status quo by only a seven to five margin.50
42. Lincoln Evening Journal, Sept. 14, 1937, at 10, col. 6.
43. Lancaster, supra note 9, at 73.
44. Id. at 72; Saylor, supra note 5, at 1, 36-38.
45. BREClMNMGE, supra note 12, at 45; OLSON, supra note 4, at 325.
46. BRECK RM GE, supra note 12, at 45. For an article extolling the vir-
tues of the nonpartisan unicameral and answering the arguments of
some of the critics, see Dobbins, Nebraska's One-House Legislature-
After Six Years, 30 NAT'L M N. REv. 511 (1941) [hereinafter cited as
DobbinsJ.
47. L.B. 244, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969). For a reproduction of the text of
the bill see Comment, To Require That A Majority of the Supreme
Court Determine the Outcome of Any Case Before It, 50 NEB. L. REv.
622 (1971).
48. REP. or THE NEB. CONSTr=TIONAL REvisiox Con'N 17 (1970).
49. 1970 bVfmTs op THE NEB. CONSTrInToNAL REvIsIoN Comnvt'N 1162-63
[hereinafter cited as MmNUTs].
50. Id. at 1675-76.
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Adam Breckenridge, who had written a book on the Nebraska
Nonpartisan Unicameral 5' which concluded that there was "no ev-
idence that much would be gained if the partisan feature were re-
stored to the Nebraska plan, '52 switched his position at the com-
mission's hearings and advocated a partisan legislature to assure
"greater opportunity for more collaboration between the Governor
and the legislators. 5 3  Representatives from both the Democratic
and Republican parties spoke in favor of repealing the nonparti-
sanship provision. The party spokesmen expressed the "feeling in
both of the political parties that the members of the Legislature are
representing no point of view other than their own" 54 and that the
legislature is not a training ground for future political leaders.55
They did concede, however, that a partisan legislature would not
cure the vast and insurmountable pile of legislation, 56 a major con-
cern of the commission members as well as the legislature.
At the Constitutional Revision Committee hearing for LB 1431
during the 1972 legislative session, the two major political parties
again supported amending the constitution to provide for a partisan
legislature. They stressed the need for better organization, greater
continuity of planning and more leadership. They again pointed
out that the legislature is a dead-end politically and that the po-
litical parties would be strengthened by a partisan unicameral. Sen-
ator Stromer suggested that the people be given a chance to vote
on the partisanship issue separate from the unicameral issue.57
During the recent 1973 session these arguments were again dragged
out and laid before the legislature with the partisans nearly obtain-
ing a victory.
Some of the studies conducted on the Nebraska Nonpartisan
Unicameral are well worth noting. A poll taken in 1961 indicated
that a majority of the present and past senators polled believed that
a partisan governor and a nonpartisan legislature got along fairly
well. Six governors, however, felt all was not well.58
A personal study conducted by Senator Marvel concluded that
decision-making in the unicameral was a complex operation in-
volving a struggle between the conservative and liberal elements of
51. BREcKENRmrDE, supra note 12.
52. Id. at 47.
53. MnINrEs, supra note 49, at 179.
54. Id. at 407-08. See notes 91, 92 infra and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 408. See notes 108, 109, 110 infra and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. Hearings on L.B. 1431 Before the Constitutional Revision Comm.,
82d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
58. NEBRASKA'S UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE, DEPTH REPORT No. 1 at 16
(School of Journalism, U. of Neb.-Lincoln, 1961).
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the state.59 In spite of this confrontation Marvel found that mod-
eration highlighted the decision-making process.60 Although one of
Marvel's sub-hypotheses was that the legislature's voting pattern
would follow strong Republican lines,61 Marvel's analysis did not
indicate any dominant Republican influence 62 or ultraconservative,
or even conservative, voting trends.63 Few bills were endorsed
by the parties, and on most measures neither party took a posi-
tion. The parties were actually of little assistance to the legisla-
tors, especially for research purposes.6 4
A study by Bernard Kolasa discovered that the Nebraska Legis-
lature was all but devoid of any party influence,6 5 and that the de-
cision-making process was one of moderation or consensus vot-
ing.6 6 However, the price paid for such moderation and consensus
decision-making was time. The political, demographic, economic,
and social environment was found to be disadvantageous for the
organization and operation of an effective and viable party struc-
ture.67  Party influence was such that some of the political proc-
59. Marvel, supra note 14, at 227.
60. Nonpartisan, supra note 35, at 109.
61. Marvel, supra note 14, at 170.
62. Id. at 221.
63. Id. at 225.
64. Nonpartisan, supra note 35, at 107.
65. B. Kolasa, The Nebraska Political System: A Study in Apartisan
Politics 479 (doctoral thesis, 1969, on file in U. of Neb.-Lincoln Love
Library) [hereinafter cited as Kolasa Thesis].
Political parties do not function effectively within the system
-they do not serve as an effective channel of communication,
they do not command much authority within the decision-
making process, and consequently they do not engender
much respect from the individuals within the system. The
institutionalized leadership devices which a sound and effec-
tive party system provides are absent and these have notbeen replaced to any great degree by any alternative means.
Id. at 476.
66. Id. at 484.
Quick decisions are rare; instead a long gestation period is
necessary while the various influences within the decision-
making process interact-the legislators, interest groups,
constituent influence, the executive, the administrators. An
accommodation of influences is necessary before action canbe taken, and the interaction toward reaching this needed ac-
commodation of interests can be a long and slow process. Itis only when there is better than majority support will action
be taken .... The process might be termed decision-making
through consensus of the participants, something more than
majority government, but yet less than unanimous agree-
ment.
Id. at 483-84.
67. Id. at 68-69.[T]he data do not provide a picture of an environment where
political parties would be expected to be active and effectve.
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esses, including the recruitment process on the executive level,
were in effect nonpartisan, and many were conducted within the
framework of limited partisanship.6 8 As one result, Kolasa rea-
soned that lobbyists must operate within an extremely favorable
environment for they serve as the most important access vehicle
between constituent and legislator.69
The 1971 evaluation of the Citizens Conference on State Legis-
latures recommended that party identification of legislative can-
didates be placed on the Nebraska ballot. This study believed that
the nonpartisan concept failed to focus public attention on major
questions of resource allocation and neglected to insure the exist-
ence of an opposition. 70
These conclusions, theories and beliefs will be compiled and
analyzed in the following section.
IV. COMPILATION & ANALYSIS
A. POLITICAL BASES
A political party is often defined as an association of men and
women with a "duality of party aims"-(1) to achieve success at
the polls7 1 and (2) once in power, to promote the policies of the
party.72 A satisfactorily operated two party system only has cleav-
age between the parties on those issues that divide the parties. If
the party structure is strong, the leaders will indicate to their fol-
The lack of significant divisive influences would point in thedirection of a structure where the party role of forging al-liances and coalitions among diverse and competing factions
would be minimal and consequently the necessity for party
participation and organization as a unifying force would be
reduced.
Id. at 68.
68. Id. at 477, 482.
69. Kolasa, Lobbying in the Nonpartisan Environment: The Case of
Nebraska, 24 W. POL. Q. 65, 77 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Kolasa].
The absence of party diminishes the competition vying forlegislative attention and enhances the position of the lobbyist.
The general reluctance of most Nebraska executives to play
a positive role in legislative affairs strengthens the dominant
position interest groups occupy. There is every reason tobelieve interest groups are eminently successful in goal
achievement given these favorable factors.
Id. at 77-78.
70. THE CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATURES:
AN EVALUATION OF THEm EFFECTIVENESS 234 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as CONFERENCE EVALUATION].
71. Keefe, Party Government and Lawmaking in the Illinois General As-
sembly, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 55, 56 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Keefe].
72. E. BUaKE, TBE WORKS OF EDMND BURKE 375 (1837).
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lowers how they should vote with little deviation permitted.7 3
Compromise and reciprocity are the bonding agents of the system.
However, except in the most disciplined parties, the reciprocity is
more often "between fluid coalitions of members that relate to
other groupings on the outside of the legislative body,"74 which is
not too divergent from the nonpartisan arena.
Many state legislatures have no real party competition and may
be classified as either nonpartisan by design, as in Nebraska and
Minnesota, or nonpartisan because of the dominance of one party.7 5
When party or factional alignments are not present the legislator
has little to refer to for voting standards, and his pattern of voting
becomes compartmentalized. Thus without party guidance the leg-
islator may, consciously or unconsciously, respond to different
pressures when presented with different voting situations.7 6
Political research has also postulated that the more competitive
the party system, the weaker are lobbyists and pressure groups,
and conversely, the less competitive the party system, the more
likely are the special interest groups to exert influence in the deci-
sion-making process.7 7 Also postulated is that the problems aris-
ing from the inadequacies of the nonpartisan system become more
acute as the increasing influence of the modern legislature affects
greater numbers of people over wider areas of their lives.78
In Nebraska, because of the non-political ballot, the direct pri-
mary becomes a restricted elimination contest. The two candidates
receiving the largest vote in the primary are entered on the No-
vember general election ballot. The common outcome is that the
73. Hagan, supra note 2, at 316.
74. Id. at 324.
Settlements, if any, may be made in caucuses,.., in the reg-
ular weekly sessions between legislative leaders and the
governor during sessions of the legislature, and in other ad
hoc meetings. All of the participants who should be con-
sulted on a particular matter may not attend any particular
meeting, but the matter will be "cleared" with appropriate
lobbyists or other representatives .... A floor fight may oc-
cur, but usually the outcome is known in advance.
Id. at 325.
75. Patterson, Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One-Party State Leg-
islature, in AMERICAN LEcisLAnm BEIIWVIORS A READER 365 (S. Patter-
son ed. 1968). Reprinted from 26 PUB. Op. Q. 185 (1962).
76. Id. at 377.
77. Kolasa, supra note 69, at 65. See also Zeigler, Interest Groups
in the States, in PoIiTics IN THE AmmicmN STATES 141 (H. Jacob &
K. Vines eds. 1965); H. ZEIGLER & M. BAER, LOBBYING: INTERACTION
AND INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN STATE LEGIsLATuREs 199 (1969); V. KEy,
SouTmERN PoraTics IN STATE AND NATION (1949).
78. MIrrAu, supra note 2, at 81.
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candidate with the highest tally in the primary wins at the general
election, and the victor is usually the incumbent.79 The political
registration figures in 1968 showed a fifty-two to forty-six percent
Republican-Democratic division; however, since the first two uni-
cameral sessions, the Democrats have rarely held over one-third of
the legislative seats. This may indicate that the nonpartisan fea-
ture gives more influence to the Republicans than the actual politi-
cal division in the state might warrant.8 0
These political bases necessarily form the theories for and
against a nonpartisan unicameral which now will be examined.
B. THEORIES IN CONFLICT
All theories of government require a balancing between the ad-
vantages and the disadvantages of any particular concept. The
nonpartisan legislature is no exception. Although the Nebraska
Nonpartisan Unicameral is now supported by its former foe, tra-
dition,8 ' it is only fitting that the balancing should continue and
that the conflicting theories should be reassessed. The remainder
of this article will be devoted to an analysis of (1) the partisanship
arguments, (2) the nonpartisanship arguments, and (3) the con-
flicting arguments of both.
1. Partisanship Arguments
a. Leadership and Organization
Advocates of the partisan legislature continually deride the non-
partisan legislature for its "crisis in leadership," that is, its failure
to provide the necessary leadership and organization to achieve an
efficient legislature.8 2
79. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 12, at 35.
80. Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 489.
[A] good Democratic election year is not reflected in the leg-
islative contests. There is also much to support the conten-
tion that nonpartisan elections favor candidates from a socio-
economic background that traditionally identifies with the
Republican party.
Id.
81. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 12, at 5; OLSON, supra note 4, at 327.
82. Hearings, supra note 57; Auton, The Legislative Politics, Policy: 1959,
14 RUT. L. REv. 269, 275 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Auton]; Kolasa
Thesis, supra note 65, at 472. See Keefe, supra note 71, at 70. In re-
ply, nonpartisan advocates make the constant comparison to the suc-
cess of other nonpartisan bodies as city councils and boards of ed-
ucation; however, this comparison is inappropriate because those bod-
ies usually have a leader designated, are not overseen by a partisan
from another branch of government, and have a considerably differ-
ent, if not easier, governmental task. Cf. Saylor, supra note 5, at 39.
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The nature of leadership is largely tied to the personnel of the
body and thus fluctuates from session to session and issue to issue.
A general, over-all legislative program is frequently lacking and
thus the legislative process is largely one of interest group inter-
action, supplemented and occasionally superseded by executive di-
rection.83
The result is that time is often wasted,84 and voting becomes com-
partmentalized.8 5 Moreover, without political party control per-
sonal animosities may create legislative deadlocks.88
Party control has never been strong in Nebraska, however,87
and there is significant evidence that party influence in most par-
tisan state legislatures is weaker than commonly supposed.88 Party
shifts and party bickering may waste more time and create more
confusion than in a nonpartisan environment. Furthermore, be-
cause the majority party takes full command of the legislature they
usually give special treatment to their own measures and stall the
bills of the opposition,8 9 and, of course, the best office facilities
and clerical assistance often pass to the majority.
One consequence of partisanship is that the importance of the
party leadership depends to some extent upon whether the gov-
ernor is of the majority party or the minority party. With the
weight of the publicity and patronage of the governor's office the
party leadership and influence increases significantly. If the gov-
ernor is of the minority party, he is in a weakened position and
must normally avoid partisanship. 90
The leadership and organization of the unicameral may be im-
proved by partisanship, but there would be certain distinct disad-
vantages.
83. Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 384.
Without party guidance, the freshman senator must turn to
the more experienced legislator for aid in making import-
ant decisions, such as election of the legislative leaders, mak-
ing choices for committee assignments, and co-sponsoring
legislation from the beginning of the session.
Nonpartisan, supra note 35, at 108.
84. See notes 65, 66 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
86. Saylor, supra note 5, at 40.
87. See notes 35, 36 supra and accompanying text.
88. B. ZELLER, A1viERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ox'i AMERICAiN LEGISLATURES, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE Ass'N 189
(1954) [hereinafter cited as ZELLER].
89. Keefe, supra note 71, at 69.
90. Auton, supra note 82, at 275; Jewell, Comparative Research in
State Legislative Politics, in AMERICAN LEGISLATIvE BEHAVIOR 396, 401
(S. Patterson ed. 1968). See note 145 infra and accompanying text.
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b. Narrowing the Issues
Opponents of nonpartisanship claim that a partisan unicameral
would narrow and define the issues with more precision than the
present forty-nine individuals making up the legislature. The par-
tisan desire is to have at least two cogent issues instead of ten to
forty-nine vague onesY1 This contention fails to realize that a vast
amount of the legislature's business involves little or no contro-
versy and the parties are, or should not be, interested in itY2 Also,
the proponents of nonpartisanship believe that each senator should
have his own view and be free to express his constituents' feelings,
not the party's.
c. Fixing Responsibility
The partisan supporters charge that there is no collective re-
sponsibility in the nonpartisan legislature. 93 Nonpartisanship tends
to frustrate protest voting for it encourages the avoidance of issues
of policy during the campaign.9 4 It "results in campaigns largely
devoid of issues and the election of 49 individuals uncommitted to
any program or any philosophy."95 The claim is that the voters
are usually uninformed and to cast their ballot intelligently they
need a party label for identification. 96 There is probably a clearer
focus of responsibility under a partisan set-up, a better accounting
to the electorate, and though deadlock is possible, it is a short-run
phenomenon and one that is generally resolved through mutual
concessions or at the next election.9"
Norris' answer to this charge was that if a man rode into office
on a party label, the voter would know little or nothing about
where the senator stood on matters of state policy, because parties
usually divide primarily along national lines.98 It is also argued
91. See Hearings, supra note 57; MNUTEs, supra note 49, at 408.
92. See Keefe, supra note 71, at 70.
93. Adrian, Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections, 46
AM. POL. Sci. R.v. 766, 775 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Adrian].
See Dobbins, supra note 46, at 511.
94. Adrian, supra note 93, at 772-73. There have been violent changes in
partisan bodies as during the depressions but no such fluctuations in
nonpartisan bodies. Id. at 774.
95. Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 477. "Though it may appear they are
free agents, by the nature of the situation, they respond to the more
narrow interests patterning individual motivation-prejudice, spe-
cialized interest groups, or self-interest." Id.
96. Testimony by Dr. Robert Sittig, Hearings on L.B. 299 Before the Gov-
ernment and Military Affairs Comm., 77th Neb. Leg. Sess., at 27 (1967).
97. Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 488. See CONFERENCE EVALUATION,
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
98. One-House, supra note 19, at 99.
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by nonpartisan adherents that when state party platforms are
drawn they rarely delineate any precise distinctions between the
parties,99 and, besides, the party platforms are seldom followed. 100
d. Preserve an Organized Opposition
The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures believed that the
Nebraska nonpartisan feature was unable to provide an organized
opposition to insure the complete presentation of all the aspects of
an issue and to represent all interest involved.10 1 This claim, how-
ever, conflicts, at least in part, with other charges that the nonpar-
tisan legislature presents too many views 0 2 and that the special
interest groups are more than adequately represented. 0 3 It may
be true that some interests are not organized. It is also true that
the parties may not be concerned with the issue, resulting in a non-
partisan situation anyway, or the parties may stifle any opposition
other than the one or two views that they represent.
e. Strengthen the Parties
A frequently expressed reason for establishing a partisan legis-
lature is to strengthen the political parties. 0 4 Of course, those who
are not dedicated to the party system find this a hollow argument.
Partisans argue that with a nonpartisan legislature there can be
no fruitful participation of parties at the state level, the only public
political arenas are the governor's office and the national offices,
and the two-party system is the victim. 0 5 A study by C. R. Adrian
99. Dobbins, supra note 46, at 511-12.
100. For example, Gov. J.J. Exon as the titular head of the Democratic
party vetoed two 1972 legislative measures, state aid to schools and
election of Omaha school board members by district, which were both
planks in the Democratic party platform and advocated by the
party in the campaign. See Lincoln Evening Journal, March 28, 1972,
at 5, col. 2; Lincoln Sunday Journal & Star, April 9, 1972, at 4, § B,
col. 1.
101. See CONFERENcE EVALUATION, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
102. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 149, 150, 151, 152, 153 infra and accompanying text.
104. See Hearings, supra note 57; Adrian, supra note 93, at 767; MITAU,
supra note 2, at 95.
105. BREcKENimGE, supra note 12, at 44-45.
By some, who think Nebraska has succumbed to becoming
a one-party state (Republican), the charge or blame is put
on the nonpartisan feature of the legislature .... To some
Republican stalwarts on the other hand there is concern
not so much about the two-party system as there is for a
closer liaison between the governor and the party in the legis-
lature.
Id. There is some evidence that the Democratic party would be the
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found that the results of a nonpartisan election were that political
leaders were segregated strictly to either partisan or nonpartisan
areas; channels for recruitment of candidates for partisan offices
were restricted as well as nonpartisan offices; funds for financing
nonpartisan and partisan election campaigns were nearly com-
pletely segregated; and facilities for fund-raising by candidates for
nonpartisan offices were restricted by nonpartisanship. 10 6 On the
other hand, the nonpartisan legislature has not hindered the parties
in their traditionally accepted privileges and functions such as plat-
form writing and espousal of a program during campaigns for other
state and local offices or for national offices. 10 7
f. Legislature Dead-End Politically
The political parties claim that the legislature does not train fu-
ture leaders' 08 and as a result is a dead-end politically. 0 9 This may
be a valid charge since no national office holders have arisen from
the legislative ranks and only Vic Anderson and Robert Crosby
have achieved the governor's office from the legislature. 1 0 Again,
for those persons who are not strong party members this is a weak
argument. At any rate, legislators would undoubtedly make expe-
rienced and competent political office holders in the partisan arena
if the parties would tap the candidate resources in the legislature.
g. Separate Vote for Nonpartisanship
George Norris was adamant that the nonpartisan concept be
inextricably joined with the unicameral concept and be voted upon
as one innovation."' With this he was successful. If the 1924 vote
on nonpartisanship as a distinct issue was any example, 112 the elec-
torate in 1934 may have struck down the nonpartisan feature if
separated from the unicameral concept. The proponents of a par-
tisan legislature, and even some of the opponents, believe that the
people should have an opportunity to voice their support or non-
support for a nonpartisan legislature. 1 3  Times change, people
change and the political environment changes; maybe an expres-
sion of public approval or disapproval is warranted.
big beneficiary of a partisan unicameral. See note 80 supra and ac-
companying text.
106. Adrian, supra note 93, at 769-72.
107. BRECKENPIGE, supra note 12, at 45-46.
108. MINUTES, supra note 49, at 408.
109. Hearings, supra note 57.
110. MIN TEs, supra note 49, at 408.
111. See notes 9, 15 supra and accompanying text.
112. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
113. Hearings, supra note 57.
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2. Nonpartisanship Arguments
a. Little Distinction Between the Parties
Nonpartisans argue that there is only a small difference, if any,
between the two political parties. This phenomenon has been true
in the past"1 4 as well as the present." 5 As each party attempts to
approach the center of the political spectrum where the majority of
votes are believed to be, they tend to blend together, the result be-
ing there may be more political variance within the separate fac-
tions of a party than between the two parties themselves. In any
event, if the voter is unable to discern the fine distinction between
the parties, he ends up in the same predicament that he may be in
under the nonpartisan system, voting for the man. The only other
choice would be to vote for the party, for whatever the voter might
think it represents, out of party allegiance.
The parties argue, of course, that they do offer viable alterna-
tives that the voters can recognize. They further declare that the
two-party system is the foundation of our democratic system, and
its organization is a necessity for efficient, orderly government.
b. Avoid National Controversies
One of the desires of the proponents of nonpartisanship has been
to keep the state legislature grounded upon state issues rather than
embroiled in national controversies.1 6 State concerns such as law
enforcement, conservation, education, elections, local government,
daylight saving time, liquor control, water safety, highway con-
struction, teacher retirement plans, trucking permits, and many
others are primarily indigenous to the state. The political divisions
are between geographic or economic interests, not any national
party interest." 7 Thus the reason that partisanship is weaker in
the state legislatures may be because the two major national par-
ties are divided on national issues which do not figure greatly in the
politics of the states."18
The partisan answer is that the parties can and do represent
state concerns, but if the national issues seem to be infused in state
affairs, it is probably because the federal government has become
so all-encompassing that its actions permeate the state and local
114. Dobbins, supra note 46, at 512; BRECKENRImDGE, supra note 12, at 46;
OLSON, supra note 4, at 326.
115. Hearings, supra note 57.
116. One-House, supra note 19, at 89; Srb, supra note 13, at 632; Hearings,
supra note 57.
117. MITAu, supra note 2, at 95.
118. ZELLER, supra note 88, at 189, 192.
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levels to a much greater extent today. Thus national political divi-
sions are more relevant now than in the past.
c. Small Population
Nebraska has a small population, approximately one and one-
half million people, and although it is geographically large it re-
sembles the constituency size of many nonpartisan metropolitan
city governments rather than most populace state governments.
The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures admits that the pop-
ulation size and density of states may influence the character and
scale of legislative capabilities. 1 9 Other political studies argue
that urbanization is positively associated with competitive party
voting.2 0 As a result Nebraska may be more suited to a nonparti-
san system than a partisan system. The partisans may call this
nonsense since the state issues are not that dependent upon popula-
tion, and even if they were, Nebraska is becoming more urban with
every passing year. Thus Nebraska's problems will soon be, if they
are not already, primarily urban political problems.
d. Forty-Nine Senators in One House
George Norris claimed that every one house legislature should
be elected on a nonpartisan basis.' 1  A unicameral could probably
be partisan or nonpartisan, but it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a bicameral legislature to be nonpartisan because of the
greater need for coordination, unification and some common de-
nominator to achieve efficiency. 22 The bicameral Minnesota Leg-
islature is a good example of the failure of nonpartisanship in a
two-house environment.2 3  Thus a nonpartisan legislature is pre-
sumably only capable of success in a unicameral.
119. CONFERENCE EVALUATION, supra note 70, at 59. But compare Waldron,
The Legislative Assembly in a Modern Montana Constitution, 33 MONT.
L. REv. 14, 24-26 (1972).
120. Cutright, Urbanization and Competitive Party Politics, 25 J. POL. 552-
64 (1963).
In a sparsely populated environment, the role of parties as
candidate recruitment organs may be diminished as informal,
personal interrelationships play a larger and more effective
role in identification and decision-making by the voter. This
may also contribute toward diminishing the need for party fi-
nancial support since the candidate is already known to a
great percentage of the potential electorate through normal
day-to-day contacts.
Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 68.
121. One-House, supra note 19, at 89.
122. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 2, 7 supra and accompanying text.
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It has been stated that "a legislature should be large enough to
reflect the major interests of the state and small enough to be truly
deliberative.112 4 In some states there exists a strong belief in a
large, unwieldy legislature to keep the volume of legislation to a
minimum and to protect against pressure group activity. How-
ever, the "larger assemblies have not demonstrated these virtues,
for because of their size they are likely either to be controlled by a
few leaders or to be stampeded into unwise action.1125 The Ne-
braska Legislature with only forty-nine senators in one house is
in an advantageous position. The conclusion of the Citizens Con-
ference on State Legislatures was that because of the unicameral
feature and because of the small number of legislators the Ne-
braska Legislature is the least complex and one of the more com-
prehensible systems in the nation.126 Thus one of the most crucial
ingredients for the success of a nonpartisan unicameral may well
be the achievement of a small, manageable number of legislators.
3. Conflicting Arguments
a. Individualism v. Party Control
Adherents of nonpartisanship advocate legislative individuality
and independence. The desire is to divorce lawmaking from party
politics and to have measures considered upon their merits rather
than upon the possibility of their political consequences. 27 The
result is to place more responsibility upon the individual senator
and less reliance upon party "bosses" and "machines" to make leg-
islative decisions.128  Every legislator may offer his own bills and
secure a public hearing instead of relying upon the approval of the
party and their control over legislation to get a measure consid-
ered.129
Legislative friendships in the nonpartisan legislature become
extremely important politically for "vote trading" to gain the nec-
essary majority support to enact legislation. 80 Senator Marvel ob-
served that the decisions of Nebraska's senators are individually or-
124. Essentials, supra note 20, at 11.
125. ZELLm, supra note 88, at 63.
126. CoRFMrENCE EVALUATioN, supra note 70, at 234. The small size does
require more time for committee work, public hearings and other leg-
islative activities for each legislator; however, each senator becomes
more familiar with the particular problems. See Carter, supra note
37, at 112.
127. See Senning, supra note 9, at 349; MirrAu, supra note 2, at 96.
128. See Srb, supra note 13, at 632; MITAu, supra note 2, at 95.
129. See note 74 supra.
130. Nonpartisan, supra note 35, at 108.
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iented-not strictly urban or rural, Democratic or Republican, con-
servative or liberal, business or labor as such. The stimuli comes
from intimate, minute details, not generalities.1 3 1 The nonpartisan
question is, "Do not the legislators owe their loyalty to their con-
stituents, and is it not more desirable that they be responsible to
the citizens of their home districts than to governors or political
leaders?"
The partisan supporters declare that party control allows for
negotiations and concerted effort, and in the absence of a party
structure there is no vehicle to impose a necessary, yet unpopular,
decision upon the participants.3 2 "The unifying and moderating
effect of the political party structure is one way in which the
larger interests, the general welfare if one prefers, can rise above
the competing individual narrow interests.' ' 33
The partisans deny the total impact of individualism because of
the unifying role played by certain individuals in the nonpartisan
environment. The nonpartisan legislators who are experts in par-
ticular legislative areas become so prominent as to command a fol-
lowing on their own credentials, thus mitigating the individualistic
spirit espoused by the nonpartisans. Professor Breckenridge has
described the conflict in these terms:
This suggestion of the rankest individualism is not borne out in
practice, however, for there are the usual attachments and loyal-
ties, the usual influence of seniority, of geographical distribution,
of positions on committees. Leadership arises also from purely
personal abilities of members, although the leadership may shift
during a session many times on separate questions. The changing
alignments may develop on such matters as changing the tax base,
or holding the line on the budget, or a division of state-collected
locally-shared revenues, or a division on such questions as water
use, or control of or possible sale of school lands. At other times
the alignments will shape along liberal-conservative philosophies,
particularly when governmental reorganization is being considered
on the controversial subjects of rural representation and redistrict-
ing .... [T]hese features are not unique: it is rather that they
provide a different emphasis upon leadership and the prospects for
developing majority support for any particular measure before the
legislature.13 4
b. Party Interest in Major Issues Only
Proponents of a nonpartisan legislature readily point out that
even in the most partisan legislature there is often a lack of party
131. Marvel, supra note 14, at 13.
132. See Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 483-84; Keefe, supra note 71, at
70-71.
133. Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 477.
134. BRscKENRUGE, supra note 12, at 46-47.
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cohesion. The parties generally concentrate their attention only
on major issues.133 When 1400 to 1500 bills are in the hopper the
parties have little interest in the vast majority of the legislation,
particularly those state issues which involve little or no contro-
versy, such as parks, county fairs, soil conservation, fish and game
fees, care of the insane, motor vehicle and traffic regulations, and
state institutions. 186 Thus the need, if any, for party organization
is minimal.
The parties on the other hand may agree that they are not con-
cerned with all the distinct issues, but they do provide the frame-
work to assure efficient consideration of these measures. The par-
ties provide the organization to quickly dispense with noncontro-
versial bills so that more important questions are reserved suffi-
cient time for deliberation.
c. Separation of Powers
The political reality of having a partisan governor and a non-
partisan legislature has created an unusual and curious state of af-
fairs. Some governors have used the nonpartisan feature to their
advantage; others have used nonpartisanship as an excuse to re-
main isolated from the legislative arena.137 Most governors have
not been overly fond of the nonpartisan aspect of the unicameral, 138
one reason being that the partisan governor has to bear the whole
responsibility of getting the party platform passed through a non-
partisan legislature. 39
The legislators on the other hand have been rather pleased with
the legislative structure.140 It is interesting to note that Senator
Marvel discovered in his research concerning the 1959, 1961 and
1963 legislatures that the composite legislative decisions had "a
definite anti-gubernatorial relationship" resulting in a decision-
making stand-off between the legislature and the governor.14'
The proponents of a partisan legislature see the obvious solu-
tion to this confrontation as the change to a partisan unicameral.
The beneficial consequences would include more collaboration be-
tween the governor and the legislators, 42 executive-legislative
135. See Keefe, supra note 71, at 68, 70; Auton, supra note 82, at 274.
136. Keefe, supra note 71, at 70.
137. Nonpartsan, supra note 35, at 107.
138. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
139. ZELLER, supra note 88, at 212. But see note 100 supra and accompa-
nying text.
140. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
141. Marvel, supra note 14, at 221, 225.
142. See MYbw s, supra note 49, at 179. See also note 53 supra and ac-
companying text.
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teamwork for reform platforms and proposals,'1 4 3 more coordina-
tion on state appropriations, 144 and increased governmental effi-
ciency.
However, assuming that a partisan unicameral would result in
a Republican majority, although a Republican governor would have
a definite advantage, a Democratic governor might be better off
with a nonpartisan legislature. 145  Another consideration to be
reckoned with under a partisan scheme is that the legislators are
elected for four year terms with one-half of the unicameral up for
election every two years. Thus one party may dominate in a guber-
natorial election year but fail to control the legislature, or a gov-
ernor may lose his legislative majority in a non-gubernatorial elec-
tion year. Either event may result in political antipathy between
the branches.
Nonpartisan adherents fear that the gubernatorial domination
of the legislature would jeopardize the traditional separation of
powers and the distinct autonomy the legislature has as a check
and balance upon the executive branch.14 6 The legislature already
has sufficient checks upon its power: public opinion, the gov-
ernor's veto, judicial review, and the initiative and referendum.
It does not need the additional influence of a governor with power
over a legislative party to diminish legislative power.147
The nonpartisans claim that the governor is not now at any
great disadvantage in commanding a following. 48 And they con-
clude philosophically that it has been the trademark of representa-
tive government in the United States that the political process
moves safely and cautiously rather than with the utmost efficiency
and haste.
d. Lobbying
One argument for the adoption of a nonpartisan unicameral was
that the influence of lobbyists and pressure groups would be dimin-
143. See MIrrAU, supra note 2, at 97.
144. Until the 1973 legislative session, if the legislature was able to over-
ride the governor's budget recommendations by a 2/3, formerly 3/5
vote, the governor could not veto the increase. This caused con-
siderable friction. However, the constitution has now been amended
to permit a gubernatorial veto of a budgetary increase. NEB. CONST.
art. IV, § 7 (1920), as amended in 1964 and 1972.
145. Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 488. See note 90 supra and accom-
panying text.
146. See Essentials, supra note 20, at 13-14; MrrAU, supra note 2, at 95-
96.
147. See Rodgers, One House for 20 Years, 46 NAT'L MUN. REv. 338, 347
(1957).
148. See generally note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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ished. 149 This hope has not been realized. Nebraska is acknowl-
edged to possess a strong pressure system made up of a few dom-
inant interest groups. 150 The lobbyists direct their attention to the
key people in the unicameral upon any particular issue, and they
tend to be eminently successful. 15 The Nebraska experience sub-
stantiates the inverse strength relationship of political parties and
interest groups. In other words, Nebraska resembles one-party
state legislatures which have little party competition and consid-
erable interest group activity. 52
Lobbyists in the nonpartisan unicameral are themselves highly
partisan with the major percentage of them being Republicans.
Unlike other state legislatures, many Nebraska lobbyists are law-
yers, and almost unique among legislatures is the interchange of
roles-lobbyist to legislator, legislator to lobbyist-that occurs in
the Nebraska Legislature. 153
The nonpartisan stalwarts would probably agree that the role
of interest groups has not been lessened by nonpartisanship, how-
ever, they can point out that lobbyists do provide a valuable service
in research and information gathering and in expressing the senti-
ment of the legislators' constituents. Most supporters of nonpar-
tisanship would rather suffer the inadequacies of the strong inter-
est group system, which the senators can ignore or control when
necessary, than be subject to the inadequacies and control of a
strong party system.
149. J. SENNING, THE OxE-HouSE LEGISLATURE 87-88 (1937).
150. See Poznics IN THE AMECA STATES (H. Jacob & K. Vines eds.
1965).
In Nebraska the absence of formal party lines in the leg-
islature has not diminished these functionaries. They abound
in numbers and are as active as the occasion seems to de-
mand. Sometimes they compete with each other for favor,
whatever the degree, and the legislative chamber becomes
a place for compromise among them, a place for group deci-
sion.
BREcKENRmGE, supra note 12, at 38.
However, the membership of these interest groups and their
lobbyists are products of the same environment and must op-
erate within the same basic framework of a formal structure
and an informal process as the legislators being pressured.
Marvel, supra note 14, at 231.
151. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
[T]he dominance of interest groups is striking. Their role in
the legislative process is substantial, and lacking political
parties, they fulfill a number of roles from research organs
to recruitment of legislators.
Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 384.
152. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 74, 75, 76
supra and accompanying text.
153. Kolasa Thesis, supra note 69, at 68-69.
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e. The Legislator
The nonpartisans argue that more capable candidates are at-
tracted to a nonpartisan election than to a partisan election. 1 54
Data from the first unicameral indicated that this claim was
valid.155
The channels for recruitment of nonpartisan candidates are nor-
mally swelled by those individuals who would not run on a parti-
san ballot because they have no party identification, because they
belong to the minority party in the district,156 or because they
would not attempt or be able to attain party endorsement. Re-
cruitment for nonpartisan elections may be hindered, however, be-
cause some persons are not financially able to campaign on their
own, and if they had party endorsement and funds, they would en-
ter the race. 57 Moreover, the search for competent candidates in
the partisan elections is restricted by the nonpartisan environ-
ment. 5 8 The only conclusion that can be drawn is that nonparti-
sanship does attract capable and experienced candidates, but the
cost may be to exclude some other able persons from the process.
This conflict may very well be a draw.
V. CONCLUSION
The endeavor to balance the advantages and disadvantages of a
nonpartisan unicameral is wrought with inconsistencies; a con-
clusion as to the justification and worth of the nonpartisan feature
is elusive. However, nonpartisanship is probably only possible in
a unicameral with a small membership such as Nebraska's. Thus
it either succeeds here, or nowhere.
The most striking observation to surface is the nonpartisan po-
litical environment that pervades the Nebraska system. This alone
may justify the nonpartisan legislature. Due to the homogeneity
of the society, the minimal urbanization, the small population and
personalized political process, and the traditional individualism of
the people, nonpartisanship would probably continue to be a fea-
ture of the Nebraska Legislature even if the legislators were chosen
154. See Srb, supra note 13, at 632.
155. See notes 37, 38 supra and accompanying text; Saylor, supra note 5,
at 41. A study by C.R. Adrian acknowledges that the nonpartisan
election produces a more experienced legislator-a concomitant factor,
however, is that the experienced legislator is more conservative as a
rule. Adrian, supra note 93, at 774.
156. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
157. Adrian, supra note 93, at 769-72.
158. Id. See notes 68, 108, 109, 110 supra and accompanying text.
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on a partisan ballot.15 9 Therefore, the need for a partisan legisla-
ture is necessarily linked to the political environment, to any al-
terations of the legislative structure and to the future progress of
the state. For now, however, the Nebraska Nonpartisan Unicam-
eral satisfactorily effects adjustments among the various special
worlds and purposes which are currently pressing for realization. 60
159. See Kolasa Thesis, supra note 65, at 499-500.
160. See note I supra and accompanying text.
